

Michael Yin

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Education

Paris School of Economics

Sep. 2025 - Present

Master Analysis and Policy in Economics

Paris, France

Direct admit to M2 (research-focused final year of program)

Selected Coursework: Information, Design & Markets; Behavioral Game Theory; Networks

Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Sep. 2021 - May 2022

Master of Arts in Statistics

Cambridge, MA

Concurrent Master's program

Selected Coursework: Probability; Inference; Data Science; Causal Inference with Applications

Harvard College

Sep. 2018 - May 2022

Bachelor of Arts in Applied Mathematics with specialization in Economics

Cambridge, MA

Secondary Field (minor) in Computer Science

Honors: Summa Cum Laude, Highest Honors in Applied Mathematics, Phi Beta Kappa

Senior 48, John Harvard Scholar, Detur Book Prize, U.S. Presidential Scholar

Selected Coursework: Micro/Macro Theory; Econometrics; Market Design; Data Structures & Algorithms;

Real Analysis; Complex & Fourier Analysis; Differential Equations; Linear Algebra

Research

Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields

Thesis Ver. 2022 | AAAI Ver. 2026

Co-authored with Yannai Gonczarowski and Shirley Zhang

Accepted for oral presentation at AAAI-26

Senior thesis ver., advised by Yannai Gonczarowski, awarded Hoopes Prize for “outstanding scholarly work”

Abstract: We extend the seminal model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two districts. In our setting, in addition to each student being either sincere or sophisticated, she is also either constrained - able to apply only to schools within her own district of residence - or unconstrained - able to choose any single district within which to apply. We show that several key results from Pathak and Sönmez (2008) qualitatively flip: A sophisticated student may prefer for a sincere student to become sophisticated, and a sophisticated student may prefer for her own district to use Deferred Acceptance over the Boston Mechanism, irrespective of the mechanism used by the other district. We furthermore investigate the preferences of students over the constraint levels of other students. Many of these phenomena appear abundantly in large random markets.

Characterizing the Secrecy and Efficiency Tradeoff in Matching

2026

Master's thesis advised by Olivier Tercieux

In progress, with expected defense in June 2026

Summary: Consider a two-sided matching problem such as residency matching. Suppose that all agents on one side, say doctors, have submitted ROLs to a centralized clearinghouse. Two desirable properties are secrecy (i.e., ensuring hospitals do not learn where exactly they fall on doctor ROLs to avoid bias or post-match dissatisfaction) and efficiency (i.e., if it is costly for hospitals to determine their preferences over doctors, allowing hospitals that will not be matched with some doctor to avoid reporting preferences involving this doctor). Intuitively, eliciting full ROLs from hospitals and running doctor-proposing Deferred Acceptance offline is secretive but inefficient, while running sequential doctor-proposing Deferred Acceptance and only eliciting hospital rankings as it becomes necessary is efficient but unsecretive. I am working on characterizing mechanisms on the secrecy-efficiency tradeoff frontier in increasingly general problems.

Computable Newspaper Database Group

2021

Research assistant in Melissa Dell's research group

Conducted reviews of active learning labelling tools, programmatically cleaned machine output, and analyzed OCR quality for newspaper scans from the Library of Congress's Chronicling America collection

Project on Workforce at Harvard

2020

Research assistant in David Deming's research group

Used American Community Survey data to analyze managerial role evolution and the Great Recession's impact

Analyzed usage statistics for reskilling website to drive user engagement and improve content selection

Teaching

Harvard Stat 111 - Introduction to Statistical Inference

Jan. 2021 - May 2021

Teaching Fellow

Cambridge, MA

Teach weekly sections and create instructional handouts covering topics like maximum likelihood estimators; exact and asymptotic interval estimation; and Bayesian hierarchical models

Support students through weekly office hours and virtual platform (Ed) for student questions

Grade exams and problem sets, including simulation assignments using R

Harvard Ec 1011a - Intermediate Microeconomics: Advanced (Micro Theory)

Sep. 2019 - Dec. 2019

Harvard Ec 1126 - Quantitative Methods in Economics (Econometrics)

Sep. 2020 - Dec. 2020

Course Assistant

Cambridge, MA

Hold weekly office hours to help students understand topics like Marshallian and Hicksian demand;

the envelope theorem; how to take Lagrangians; instrumental variable estimation; and Slutsky's theorem

Grade exams, modelling projects, and problem sets, including data analysis assignments using Matlab or R

Industry/Government

Holocene Advisors

Mar. 2023 - Aug. 2025

Data Scientist

New York, NY

Oversee Consumer data sourced from vendors, webscrapes, and internal collection

Create dashboards to forecast data trends and predict quarterly KPIs

Develop and test new systematic strategies through collaboration with fundamental analysts

Blackstone

May 2021 - Mar. 2023

Analyst, Data Science

New York, NY

Summer Analyst, Data Science

Develop tools to enrich private equity and real estate due diligence, such as automated cohort retention analyses and random forest-based screeners for potential growth-stage investments

Work with portfolio companies stakeholders on customer segmentation, cross-sell modeling, etc.

QuantCo

Jun. 2020 - Jan. 2021

Quantitative Research Intern

Fully Remote

Contribute to generalized linear model library forked from sklearn (github.com/Quantco/glum)

Create quasi-UI for actuaries to visualize models and graphically adjust regularization parameters

Council of Economic Advisers

Jun. 2019 - Aug. 2019

Intern, Labor and Poverty

Washington, DC

Write and fact check both internal and public-facing memos on federal economic policy

Track economic indicators like job numbers and review the literature on topics like homelessness

Skills

Foreign Languages: French: Intermediate Mandarin (Spoken): Advanced | Mandarin (Written): Intermediate

Programming: Python, SQL, Bash, R, MATLAB, Java, Stata

Tools: AWS, GitHub, Excel, IPUMS, Bloomberg